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JOHN E. DONALDSON

Law Reform-Suggested Revisions to
Virginia's Wills Statutes
Part Two
PART One of this article, which was published in
the spring, 198:1 issue of The Virginia Bar Journal,
noted that the Executive Committee of The Virginia
Bar Association has requested the Committee on
Wills, Trusts and Estates to undertake a study of Virginia law relating to succession to property and
administration of estates. The Committee, in its work
to date, has examined the adequacy of Virginia law in
anum ber of areas and has carefully considered statutory approaches employed in other states, including
those which have adopted the Uniform Probate Code.
The Committee's efforts thus far have contributed to
the enactment of a number of statutory changes over
the last several years.
The first installment of this article discussed several proposed revisions to Virginia's wills statutes
which are under consideration by the Committee on
Wills, Trusts and Estates. The remaining proposals
currently under active consideration are presented in
this segment, which, like the first, is intended to
inform the har of proposed changes and to invite
comments and suggestions. The Committee hopes to
report its recommendations to the Executive Committee prior to the 1984 session of the General Assembly.

D. Effect of Marriage of Testator
after Execution of Will
Because of recent changes in the intestate succession statutes, ~ 64.1-1 and ~ 64.1-11, additional statutory changes are needed to better implement the presumed intent of a testator who executes a will and
subsequently marries. Virginia law, set forth in S04.158, provides that neither the subsequent marriage of a
testator nor birth of a child to a testator, or hoth, shall
operate to revoke a will previously executed by the
testator. Although the marriage of a testator does not
revoke his will, the renunciation statutes provide
relief to a surviving spouse aggrieved by the provisions of the will.
The inadequacy of Virginia law may be illustrated
by the following examples: Suppose that a hachelor
executes a will leaving his entire estate to his brother,
and that he subsequently marries, and fails, for what10

ever reason, to execute a new will pnor to death.
Under current law, if there are no children, the surviving spouse may renounce the will and pursuant to
§ 64.1-16 claim one-half of the net personalty, and
pursuant to ~ 64.1-19, claim one-third ofthe realty as
dower. Brother will get the residue. Suppose, however,
that there is a child born of the marriage. The results
differ. Where the testator is survived by both his
spouse and child, the spouse's share upon repudiation drops from one-half to one-third of the net personalty and the spouse remains entitled to one-third
of the realty as dower. Brother again gets the residue,
which is larger than it would have been had there
been no afterborn child. The child gets nothing, notwithstanding that he is seemingly a "pretermitted
heir." Under § 64.1-70 the child's share as a "pretermitted heir" is exactly zero because of the effect of
1982 amendments to S 04.1-\ and ~ 61.1-11. Section
64.1·70 purports to give the "pretermitted heir" the
share that he would have taken had the decedent died
intestate. However, by reason of the 19f12 amendments, if the decedent had died intestate, his surviving spouse, being a parent of all of his issue, would
have succeeded to the entire estate. Suppose further,
however, that after the marriage and birth of the
child, the testator's spouse dies or divorce occurs, and
testator dies survived by the child. Here, notwithstanding the will provision leaving everything to
brother, hrother gets nothing and child gets the entire
estate by force of§ 64.1·70, the entire estate heing the
child's intestate portion in such circumstance.
The divergent results that flow from current statutes cannot be defended on policy grounds. Such
results are unintended consequences of the 1982
amendments to ~ 64.1-1 and § 64.1-11. Sounder results
would obtain if Virginia fol lowed a rule which treated
the "pretermitted spouse" as being entitled to an
intestate portion. Where there are no children or
where the surviving spouse is the parent of all of the
testator's children, the intestate portion of the surviving spouse would be the entire estate. Where the surviving spouse is not the parent of all the decedent's
children, the intestate portion would be one-third of
the net personalty plus one-third of the realty as

dower. The Uniform Probate Code at ~ 2-:101 provides
an intestate portion to the surviving spouse who married the testator after the execution of his will.
Legislative proposal.') adds new section 64.1-69. 1. It
is set forth in the Appendix and borrows heavily from
the U.P.C.

~I
I

E. Effect of Divorce on a Will;
Other Changes of Circumstances
Where a testator becomes divorced a vinculo matrimonii aft!:'r th!:' execution of a will, all provisions in
the will in favor of the divorced spouse are thereby
revoked, but not the will itself, by force of § 64.1-59.
This statute does not address the possibility that the
testator may subsequently remarry the divorced
spouse. A number of other states, including those
which have adopted U.P.C. S 2-50R, anticipate this
event and provide that upon remarriage to the
divorced spouse the testator's will, if otherwise in
effect, is automatically revived.
Leg-islativ!:' proposal 6, set forth in the Appendix ,
amends § 64.1.')9. In addition to following the
approach of the u.P.c. set forth above, the draft legislation shifts from ~ 6·1.1-5R to § 54.I-fi9 the rule that
the subsequ!:'nt marriage of a testator or birth of a
child to him does not operate to revoke a will. This
rule is better set forth in a "change of status" type of
statute than in a "revocation generally" type of statute. Also, the revised statute codifies the rule in Jones
v. Bro/I'll, 21~) Va. 599, 24R S.E.2d 812 (1978) that, for
purpos!:'s of construction, a divorced spouse is treated
as having pr!:'d!:'C'!:'ased the testator.
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F. Specific Bequests and Devises of
Encumbered Property
Virginia follows a common law rule that all debts
for which the testator is personally liable, including a
debt secured by property that is the subject of a specific devise or bequest, are to be paid from personalty
in the resid ue. Sec Owen v. Lee, lRf> Va. 160, :37 S.E.2d
84R (1946). The legatee or devisee th us possesses a
right to exoneration, that is, the right to require the
executor to payoff the encumbrance. Under U.P.C. §
2-609 the common law rule is reversed and the
encumbered property passes to the legatee or devisee
subject to the encumbrance.
The U.P.C. approach, with modifications, is preferable. The best rule to follow is one that implements
the intention of the hypothetical "typical" testator.
Experience reveals that testators, when interviewed
by attorneys preparing their wills and questioned
regarding their wishes as to encumbered property
that is the subject of sp!:'cific devises and bequest.",

usually express a preference that the legatee or devisee take the property with the burden of the encumbrance. They generally do not wish their executors to
be under a duty to payoff encumbrances during the
period of administration.
Although the U.P.C. does not make it, an important
distinction can be drawn between encumbered land
and tangible personalty, on the one hand, and
encumbered intangibles such as stocks and bonds on
the other. Debts secured by land and tangible personalty are usually incurred in connection with the
acquisition of, or an improvement to, the property and
are generally payable in installments over a period of
years. Hence, in the mind (lfthe "typical" testator, the
debt secured by real estate or tangible property is
closely associated with the property. He is more likely
to regard a specific bequest or devise of such property
as embracing only his "equity" in th e property. How11

ever, where a debt is secured by stocks or bonds it is
less likely that the deht was incurred in connection
with the acquisition of the particular securities. Often
stocks and bonds are pledged as security for lines of
credit or other forms of short-term borrO\",ing. A testator, having executed a will that specifically hequeaths
his securities to a particular legatee, prohably docs
not intend, when he pledges tht: securities as collateral for a loan, to impair the value of the legacy in the
event that he dies before the loan is repaid.
Legislative proposal 7, which would add new § 64.162.2, is set forth in the Appendix. The draft follows
the approach of the U.P.C. as to realty and tangible
personalty, but not as to intangihles, and draws upon
features of applicahle New York law.

power. The U . P.c. at S ~-o 1() is typical of the majority
position in requiring a will to make specific reference
to a power of appointment to exercise the power. The
majority position is thus one of implementing a presumption that the donor of a power of appointment
would prefer the appointive property to pass under
the terms of his trust instrument or will except where
the donee has affirmatively manifested an intent to
exercise the power. Because such a presumption is
correct in most cases, the approach of the u.P.C.
is preferred.
Legislative proposal 8, patterned on the U .P.C.,
amends ~ 61.1-67 and is set forth in the Appendix. It
applies to both special and general powers of appointment.

G. Exercise of Power of Appointment;
Effect of Residuary Clause

H. Ademption by Satisfaction

Virginia law respecting the circumstances under
which a will is regarded as exercising a power of
appointment possessed by a testator is not adequate.
Section 64.1-67 requires that a will, otherwise silent
on the testator's intention to exercise a general power
of appointment, be construed as if its dispositive provisions em braced the appoin ti ve property. Thus, a
residuary clause is construed as exercising such a
power of appointment. See Machir v. Funk. 99 Va. 284,
18 S.E.2d 197 (189:3). It is unclear whether a special
power of appointment is exercised by a residuary
clause. See Note, 47 Va. L. Rev. 711 (1961). If, however, the instrument creating the power requires that
specific reference be made to the power before it can
be exercised, the requirement will be given effect. See
Ho/tzhach v. United Va. Bank, 216 Va. 482, 219
S.E.:ld 868 (I mfi).
The use of powers of appointment in estate plan ning has changed significantly since 1948, when the
estate tax marital deduction first became available.
The most frequent usc of the general power of
appointment today occurs in connection with marital
deduction trusts. A typical decedent who gives his
spouse general appointive power over the corpus of a
trust is more likely to be motivated by the tax advan tage than by the likelihood that his spouse will
exercise control over the devolution of his property.
He typically anticipates the non-exercise of the power
by designating takers in default of appointment and
more often than not requires a specific reference to the
power be made in the instrument exercising the power
for the exercise to be effective.
A majority of American jurisdictions have rejected
the Virginia approach and resolve the policy issue hy
deferring to the presumed intent of the donor of the

Where a testator makes provision in his will for a
legatee, and thereafter makes gifts to the legatee, it is
possible that he intends the gifts to be in reduction of
the legacy and also possible that he intends the gifts
to be additional bounty. Virginia, at ~ 64.1-6:~ , provides that a provision for or advancement to a devisee
or legatee is in satisfaction of a devise or beq uest if it
appears from parol or other evidence to have been so
intended. Presumably, in the absence of evidence of
intent, a gift to a legatee is not in reduction of the
legacy.
The Virginia statute is deficient in several respects.
It does not address the quality of the evidence
required, nor the burden of proof. Is the evidence to be
"dear and convincing?" The term " other evidence" is
vague. For example, does the fact that the value of
gifts made to the legatee is substantial in relation to
the amount of the legacy constitute evidence that the
gifts are intended to be in reduction of the legacy?
Also, the statute, in permitting the lise of parol evidence, invites the use of the most unreliable kinds of
testimony. If a will provides a legacy to son of $2;'),000
with the residue to daughter, and testator gave son
$1 :\()()O after executing thl' will, daughter apparently
is permitted to testify self-servingly that testator privately told her that the gifts to son were intended as
reductions in his legacy. Because in the usual case a
testator making a gift to a legatee intends additional
hounty, reliable evidence should be required if that
intent is not to be presumed.
The approach of the U.P.c. at ~ 2-1112 is preferred.
That section imposes high evidentiary requirements
in providing that a gift to a legatee does not reduce a
legacy unless the will so provides. or unless declared
by the testator in a contl'mporary writing or unless

12

the legatee acknowledges in writing that the gift is in
satisfaction of the legacy.
Legislative proposal 9, which amends ~ 64.1-63, is
set forth in the Appendix.

L Construction of Certain Legacies and
Devises; Non-Ademption in Certain Cases
After the execution of a will, and prior to the death
of a testator, property that is the subject of a specific
bequest or devise may be transformed, altered or
enlargpcl, often without affirmative action by the
testator. In addition, such property may cease to exist
or may be disposed of without affirmative action by
him. Of course, where the testator voluntarily conveys property that is subject to a specific bequest, the
conveyance effects an ademption of the property by
extinction and the legacy is in effect revoked. Should
a legacy he revoked, however, when it is described as
ten shares of stock of a particular corporation, and
the corporation changes its name, or where, by reason
of a reorganization, the corporation is ahsorbed in a
larger company and the ten shares have been surrendered and replaced by stock of the acquiring corporation ? If there is a hvo for one stock split, should
the legacy be construed as embracing twenty shares?
What result should obtain if, after executing his will,
the testator becomes incompetent and the shares are
sold by his committee?
The common law developed a "mere change in
form" doctrine which has been applied to save many
of these troublesome legacies. The trend of recent
decisions has heen enlargement of the doctrine.
Although the few decisions applying the doctrine in
Virginia are sound, the case law in this state is not
sufficiently extensive to adequately resolve a number
of issues. Other than ~ 8,01-77, which, by giving the
devisee the proceeds, prevents ademption where lands
of a person under a disability, but competent at the
execution of his will, are sold pursuant to a judicial
sale, there is no statutory law on the subject. On
ademption generally, see G. SMITH , HARRISON ON
WILLS Af'.'D ADMINISTRATION (2d Ed.) ~§ a~)7.
40'2.
Because the case law is not sufficiently developed,
legislative treatment of the problem is needed. The
U.P.C. at ~ 2-G07 and § Z-608 seeks to implement the
presumed intent of a testator in a number of situations involving transformation, alteration and enlargement of the subject property , and the destruction or
involuntary disposition of property. In so doing it
requires that the legacy be construed as embracing
the transformed or enlarged property, certain insurance proceeds, and proceeds from certain sales. The

approach of the u.P.C. is sound except where it
includes in a legacy of stock additional mutual fund
shares acquired pursuant to a plan of reinvestment
and where it embraces the proceeds unpaid at death
when the testator has voluntarily sold the property
which is the subject of the specific bequest or devise.
Legislative proposal 10, which, drawing from the
U.P.C. , adds 64.1-62.1, is set forth in the Appendix.

J. Testamentary Additions to Trusts
Having Non-Resident Trustees
In 1979 the American College of Probate Counsel
released a study which found that in thrity-nine
states and the District of Columbia there are no significant limitations on the use of non-resident trustees in connection with testamentary pour-overs. A
1982 study by that organization also found that the
majority of jurisdictions impose no substantial restrictions on the use of non-residen t fiduciaries as
executors, guardians or testamentary trustees. However, by § '26-59 and ~ 64.1-7:i Virginia prohibits, in the
case of corporations, and severely restricts, in the
case of individuals, the use of non-resident fiduciaries.
The Committee on Wills, Trusts and Estates is considering the general matter of restrictions on the use
of such fiduciaries. However, in the discussion that
follows, the focus is on restrictions applicable to testamentary additions to established trusts that have
non -resident trustees. Different policy considerations
may be in volved in the questions of whether non -resident individuals or corporations can properly serve as
executors, administrators, guardians, committees, etc.
Section 64.1-73(a)(:i) prohibits a testamentary pourover to an established trust unless at least one trustee
is a resident individual or is a corporation authorized
to do a trust business in this state, and provided that
the trust has no corporate trustee not so authorized.
However, ~ 64.1-7:i(h) provides that a pour-over to a
disqualified trust is not to fail, but a proper trustee is
to be appointed. These restrictions on use of nonresident trustees appear to serve no useful purpose
other than that of aiding the Virginia financial community. This aid comes at the expense of frustrating
the decedent's choice of trustees. Such frustration of a
decedent's choice requires a compelling reason, which
is lacking. The policy of Virginia's legislation on wills
should be to implement, ~herever possible, the decedent's validly expressed testamentary wishes. If a
testator estabhshes a lifetime trust for a child, with
testator's brother as trustee, and brother moves from
Virginia to Maryland and is a Maryland resident at
testator's death , there is no sound reason why a pourover legacy to brother, as trustee, should not be per13

mitted. Seemingly, § 64.1-73(h) will require a Virginia
court to appoint a Virginia trustee to administer the
pour-over amount as a separate trust, thus causing
the existence of two identical trusts for the same
beneficiary.
Other problems are created by § 64.1-73(a)(3). For
example, a Virginia testator may wish to make a split
interest gift to Duke University (income to son for life,
remainder to charity) and choose the device of a
legacy to the Duke University Pooled Income Fund in
the expectation of enjoying an estate tax charitable
deduction for the value of the remainder interest.
Under the Virginia statute, ifthe trustees ofthe Fund
are non-residents, they are prohibited from receiving
the testamentary pour-over. The curative provisions
of 64.1-73(h), even in the light of 26-64 et seq., which
permit court ordered transfers to non-resident trustees
in certain cases, may be inadequate to salvage the
charitable deduction. See I.R.C. § 2055(e)(2)(A) and
Treas. Reg. 1.642(c)-5(b)(5). The regulation provisions
defining a qualified "pooled income fund" require
that the charity have power to replace or remove the
trustee or trustees, a power not contemplated in
64.1-73(h).
It may be argued that there are two reasons for
requiring at least one "pour-over" trustee to be a resident or a corporation authorized to do business in this
state. These are (1) to assure a Virginia forum for the
enforcement ofthe trustee's fiduciary duties and (2) to
assure the existence of a potential defendant trustee
who is likely to have assets subject to writ of execution in this state. However, these reasons do not
explain the absolute prohibition contained in § 64.173(a)(3) against having as one of several trustees a
trustee that is a corporation not authorized to do business in this state. In any event, if these are the reasons for the current state of Virginia law, they are not
sufficiently compelling to justify the frustration of
freedom of testation resulting from the application of
the statute.
Presumably, a testator who creates during his lifetime, and while a resident of Indiana, a trust with an
Indiana trustee and executes a will providing a testamentary pour-over to the trust is content in the
knowledge that the beneficiaries of the trust will generally have to look to Indiana courts to prevent a
breach of fiduciary duty. Should he become a domicilary of Virginia and die with the same arrangements
in effect, he presumably remains content in that
knowledge. The testator having chosen to use an
Indiana trust as the vehicle to implement his dispositive scheme, thus subjecting the interests of the trust
beneficiaries to the protection of Indiana courts and
law, why should Virginia not be content with the pro14

tections afforded to the be:1eficiaries by the courts
and law of Indiana? Is the focal point of Virginia
policy the fact that the testator, at time of death was a
domiciliary of Virginia? Apparently not! If the trust
has no beneficiaries who are Virginia Residents, § 64.173(h) and § 26-64 et seq. permit, through a somewhat
cumbersome procedure, the amounts to be transferred
to a non-resident trustee. It thus appears that the
primary focal point of the policy of Virginia law in
requiring at least one resident trustee for testamentary pour-overs is not the domiciliary status of the
testator, but the present existence of one or more Virginia residents as beneficiaries of the trust.
Assuming, however, it to be valid policy for Virginia to assure to resident beneficiaries of trusts
receiving testamentary pour-overs the availability of
a Virginia forum, this policy could be furthered by a
bonding requirement in the non -resident trustee situation pursuant to which the surety on the bond consents to in personam jurisdiction in Virginia. The
implementation of such policy through the device of
requiring at least one trustee to be a resident and prohibiting altogether non-resident corporate trustees
which are not authorized to do business in this state is
overly restrictive and unduly harsh.
However, the imposition of a "bonding" requirement is not recommended. The apparent Virginia policy of assuring to Virginia residents who are beneficiaries of trusts receiving testamentary pour-overs
access to Virginia courts to remedy breaches of fiduciary duty is unsound. Virginia can properly assume
that the courts and law of the state of residence of
non-Virginia trustees will adequately remedy any
breach of fiduciary duty that may occur. The convenience afforded by a Virginia forum does not offset the
stronger policy of promoting freedom of testation.
Due regard should be given to the wishes of the testator. One's freedom of testation should not be compromised merely because assets intended to pour-over
into an existing trust are located in a state of which
the trustee is not a resident.
The fact that § 64.1-73 contemplates the appointment of a substitute trustee when the "resident trustee" proviso is violated is not sufficiently curative.
The non-resident trustee of the existing trust as to
which the pour-over amount is intended to flow may
be a family member of the settlor-testator who is
related to the beneficiary class and has special
knowledge of family circumstances and interests. He
may have been selected by the settlor-testator because
of such knowledge and relationships and given very
broad discretion to act by reason of those qualities. In
such circumstances a substitute trustee appointed
pursuant to § 64.1-73(h) would likely be a very poor

substituw for the trustee selected by the settlor-testator. Strong considerations of policy and state interest
are required to justify rejection of a trustee selected by
the settlor-testator. Rejection soley because of non-residence is not such a consideration .
Legislative proposalll, which amends ~ 64.1-n, is
set forth in the Appendix.

K. Pour-Over Trusts; Effect of Remainderman
Predeceasing Testator
The Virginia anti-lapse statute, ~ 64.1-64, is deficient in its application to beneficiaries of trusts which
receive testamentary pour-overs. This particular deficiency arises from a 1980 amendment that applies the
section to "the interest passing upon a termination of
a testamentary trust or of an inter vivos trust which
receives a devise or bequest such as contemplated in
§ 64.1 -73" (testamentary additions to trusts). As applied to remaindermen under testamentary trusts, the
amendment seems unnecessary. See Hester v. Sammons, 171 Va. 142, 198 S.E. 406 (19:38).
Presumably the "interest passing upon a termination" is a remainder interest free of trust. If so, consider the following hypothetical:
Testator, while alive establishes a revocahie trust funded with $100,000, income to
spouse for life, remainder to brother. Brother
executes a will leaving his entire estate to
brother's wife and nothing to son and dies.
One day after brother's death, testator dies
having executed a will which leaves a pourover amount of $200,000 to the lifetime trust,
which hecame irrevocable at his death. Assume that the trust corpus, as enlarged hy
the pour-over, is $:300,000 and that testator's
spouse dies shortly after testator.
Who takes the remainder in the trust corpus?
In the absence of a statute, it is probable that the
$100,000 that initially funded the revocable trust is
regarded as vested beneficially in the trust beneficiaries subject to defeasance by exercise of the power of
revocation, and since revocation did not occur during
the life of the settlor, the $100,000 that initially funded
the trust would be a descendahle interest which
passes under brother's will to his wife. See Annotation, Anti-lapse Statute as Applicable to Interest of
Beneficiary Under Inter Vivos Trust Who Predeceases Lif£>-Tenant Settlor, 47 ALR :1d :158. It is
unclear whether the 1980 amend men t to ~ 64.1-64,
which embraces both revocahle and irrevocahle trusts,
is intended to change that result. What is the meaning of the term "interest" as used in ~ 6·1. 1-64 in the
phrase "the interest passing upon a termination ... ?"
Does it refer to the entire amount held in trust, or only

to that portion of the trust attributable to the testamentary pour-over? It if means the entire interest,
including the pour-over amount, then the entire
$300,000 would pass to the brother's son, a result
inconsistent with the theory that a revocable trust
creates interests that are vested subject to defeasance
by revocation. It is that theory, pursuant to which lifetime gifts to revocable trusts are regarded as gifts in
praesentae, that permits the law to regard the revocable trust as a non-testamentary instrument not
required to be executed in accordance with the statute
of wills. Also, if the term "interest" refers to the entire
corpus as enlarged by the pour-over amount, then an
unusual result can occur in the context of our ahove
hypothetical. If brother predeceases testator by one
day, then under § 64.1-64 brother's son takes the
entire remainder, but if brother survives the decedent
by one day brother's wife gets the entire remainder.
Also, had there been no testamentary pour-over,
brother's wife would have received $100,000. See
Annotation, 47 ALR 3d :15R. Why should she be
deprived of that amount simply because testator
hequeathed the residue of his estate to the trust?
Should an anti-lapse statute enacted to implement the
presumed intent of a testator presume such divergent
treatment is intended? If, however, the term "interest"
refers only to that part of the trust attrihutable to the
pour-over amount, different results ohtain. In our
hypothetical, if brother predeceases testator by one
day then under ~ 64. 1-64 brother's wife gets one-third
of the remainder and brother's son gets two-thirds.
However, if I ':lther sur'-' ~s the testator by one day,
brother's wife gets all. Yet the language from which
we infer the intent of the testator, the words in the
trust and the will, are the same in both instances.
If Virginia's anti-lapse statute were silent on the
question of application to testamentary pour-overs,
seemingly the pour-over amount would devolve in
accordance with § 64.1-73(d)(2) which provides in
relevant part that the pour-over amount shall "he
administered and disposed of in accordance with the
terms of the trust as they appear in writing at the
testator's death." Presumably, that language is in tended simply to enlarge the trust by the pour-over
amount and to require the trust corpus, so enlarged, to
be administered in accordance with the terms of the
trust. Arguably, in our example where brother predeceases testator by one day, the entire corpus, including the pour-over amount, would pass in remainder to
hrother's wife. It is, however, possible that courts
would hold that in the absence of an anti-lapse statuw
of the present Virginia variety, the pour-over amount
passes either under the residuary clause in testator's
will or by intestacy.
15

The subject language in ~ G4.1-64 is not satisfactory
for sevl'ral rl'HSons. It is vague, as has already been
noted . In this regard, it has been suggested that the
19HO amendment was intended to "save" the remainder in a situation where testator during life gives
SI()(),()()() in trust, to "A" for life, remainder to HR,"
and life tenant dies while testator is alive followed by
t1w death of "B," the remainderman, while testator is
alive. Assuming that testator's will leaves a pour-over
amount to the lifetime trust, docs the 19HO amendml'nt to ~ fi ,1.I-f.i4 save the pour-over from lapse'! lfit
was intendf'd to do that, it apparently fails in the
effort because the amendment is applicable only
where the lifetime trust receives a pour-over contemplated hy ~ fi4.1-7:1 and § 64.1-Tl(f) by its terms permits
a pour-over only if thf' trust is operative at the testator's death. The trust is not, however, operative at
death because it terminated at the earlier death of the
life-tenant.. The suhject language is also ohjedionable
because in its application it C(luses unsatisfactorily
diverg~'nt patterns of distribution of remainder int('n'sts.
The most satisfactory treatment of the problem is
obtained by retaining the theory that revocable trusts
('reatf' presen t in terests su bject to dcf('asance by revocation and by implementing a rule that any pour-over
addition to a trust should devolve in the manner that
t.he original corpus of such trust would devolve, as if
the pour-over amount were added to t.he corpus of the
trust during the life of the testator-sl'ttior. The present
requirement nf ~ 54.l -7:)(£') that the trust hf' operative
at death for a pour-over to be effective should be
r('tained .
It is, of course, unnecessary to spell out a statutory
solution to every conceivable tpstamentary prublem.
The problems to which the 18HO amendment to ~ 64.10,1 are addressed do not appear to have arisen with
any frequency , perhaps hecase holographic ,"vilis
rarely use tlw device of testamentary pour-overs, and
trusts and wills prepared by atturneys g-enerally
address the contingencies. which left unaddressed ,
cause tlw problems. If that conclusion is drawn, th('
uffending 19HO amendment should he repealed. This
is accomplishf'd in legislative proposal I at page 2H of
thl' Spring, I ~)H:l issue of Th(, VirRinia Rar -Journa/.
If a statutory solution to thl' prohlpm is desired,
consideration should be given to legislative proposal
12, set forth in the Appendix, which clarifies ~ 1::i4.1-n.
L. Formalities of Execution

Section 64.1-49, in req ui ring for th e d Uf' f'xeCl! tion of
a non-holographic will that the witnesses subsc:ribe in
the presence of the testator and that they be present
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at the same time the testator executl'S the will or
acknowledges his prior execution, is unnecessarily
restrictive. Formalities rl'quirl'd in connection with
will executions are often justified on two broad
grounds. Th~~se are (1) the formalit.\, of will execution
imparts a ceremony to t1w act of testation. thereby
impressing the testator with the spriousness of his act
and (2) the formalities involving the role of witnesses
minimize the risks of fraud , collusiun, duress, etc. The
first g-round appears of limited importance in states
such as Virginia which permit holog-raphic wills since
the essencl' of the holographic will is the absc'nce of
c('remony in its execution.
The second ground is the sounder, hut inherent in
requiring formalitil's to pn'vl' nt " fraudulent," etc.
t('station is that fail ure t.o (Jb~l'rVl' t.he req ui red formalities frequently keeps non-fraudulent testamentary writings from being effective as w·ills. Requirements intended to prevent "fraud," etc. often , even in
the ahsence of a sug-g-cstion of fraud, operatp to prevent valid test.ation. Thus, in Virginia, testamf'ntary
effectiveness has been dl'nied when' the testat.or, after
signing a will, slipped into unconsciousness hefore
the witnesses were able to sign in his "conscious presence." 7l1('ker v. Sandridl-!<' , Hi) Va .."1'16, H S.E. G,,)O
(I RRR). Similarly, t('~tation ma.\' hl' denied where there
is doubt as to whether thl' tI'stator 's signing or
acknowledgem~'nt occurred in the simultaneous preslmceofboth witnesses. French v.lkl'il/e, 191 Va. R42,
6~ S . E.~d HH:3 (l~)Gl). C~ivpn the hurdpll of proofon the
propOlwnt of it \"ill to estahli~h dlw ex('('ut.illn, :1nd the
dilliculty of proving Yl'ars later that the required
sequence of events and grouping of persons occurred,
the Virginia courts han' resorted to presumptions to
prevent evidentiary prohll'ms from dl'fl'ating testation. Thus, the subscription of his nanw by a witness
in a room in which the LPstator is lo('att'd is prima
facie proof that the signing occurred in the "presence"
of the testator . •!\lei! v. Npil, ~H Va. Ii (IH~~)). And a
recitation in an attestation clause is prima facie proof
thereof in certain in~tan('es . ('/arl<(' v. !JIII/nae 'ant. :n
Va . 14 (1 H:19). And regularity i~ often presumed where
the witnesses are dead or suffer a failure of recollection. '{OUf1R v. Barner, fiR Va . ~)fi (187Ii) (Die/a).
As is evident. from tlw foregoing , l'al'h formality
required for a valid will execution presents a potential
source of litigation as to wheth('r such furmalit.\, was
in fact obserVl~d and POSI!S a threat that clearly
express('d non-fraudulent testamentary writings may
he defeated by oVl'rsight or h.v the will's proponent's
inability to carry his burden of proof. The U.P.c. at
§ ~-.')O~ undl'rtukes to prevl'nt "fraud," dc. by requiring only that the testator's signing or acknowledgement be witnessed by two competent persons who

subscribe their names, notwithstanding that the testator may not sign or acknowledge in the presence of
two witnesses present at the same time and notwithstanding that subscription of the will by the witnesses does not occur in the presence of the testator.
It is submitted that the protection against "fraud,"
etc. in testation afforded by the U.P.C. is entirely adequate and that the Virginia requirements of mlditional formalities are unwarranted, unnecessary, invite litigation and often defeat non-fraudulent testamentary writings. [t is frankly difficult to imagine
circumstances where fraud, collusion, etc. could occur
under the U.l'.C. requirements, but would not occur
under the existing Virginia requirements. Accordingly, it is recommended that the Virginia statute be
amended to <ielete the unnecessary formalities noted
above.
Virginia attorneys should, however, continue to follow established practice::; in will executions. These
customary practice::;, which are described in the recitations of standard attestation clauses, are designed
to assure that wills are valid under the laws of all
states. Also, compliance with the practice of having
the witnesses present at the same time assures convenience of probate, for where witnesses arc so present, the testimony of only one witness is adequate to
establish the fact of due execution. Bruce v. Shuler
. ,
lOR Va. n70, 02 S.E. ~ml (IgOR).
Holographic wills are allowed in Virginia by § 64.149. That statutI-' requires the will to be "wholly" in the
handwriting of the testator and requires that fact to
be proved by two "disinterested" witnesses. The term
"wholly" is ambiguous, but it probably means the
"material provisions" must be in the handwriting of
the testator. See Belt v. Timmins, 190 Va. 648, 58
S.E.2d 5;j (19f)()) and Gooch v. Gooch 1:14 Va. 21,11:1
S.E. Rn (l92~). The u.P.c., which, at § 2-fiO:3, also
permits holographic wills, describes the permitted
documl'nt as one in which "the material provisions
are in the handwriting of the testator." necause it is
less ambiguous, the terminology employed in the
U.l'.C. is preferred.
The Virginia r('quin~ment of proof of a holographic
will hy two "disint~'r('st('d" witm!Sses is unduly restrictive. Those who would take in the event of intestacy
are IikPly to be familiar with the handwriting of the
decedent and have ample opportunity to challenge
prohate in a formal proceeding. Although it is only a
minor deficiency, the requirement that the witnesses
who prove the authenticity of the handwriting be
"disinterested" should be eliminated.
Legislati ve propo::;al l:~ implement.s these recommendation::; by amending § 64.1-49 a nd is ::;et forth in
the Appendix.

M.

Self-Proved Will; Out-of-State
Notarial Certificates

Virginia, by § 64.1-H7.1, provides a mechanism
whereby a will may be made self-proved, that is,
admitted to prohate without further proof of due execution. The required procedure entails the testator
and the witnes::;e::; appearing before an officer authorized to administer oath::; under the law::; of Virginia
and each signing a declaration on a prescribed form .
Bya 1983 amendment, an a lternate method involving
acknowledgment under oath is provided by ~ 64.187.2. The Virginia statutes differ from the U.P.C.
counterpart, ~ 2-fi04, in that the latter gives effect to
out·of-state notarial certificates while the former do
not.
Virginia's various statutes with respect to out-ofstate notarial acts are not consistent. By rea::;on of a
19HO amendment, ~ 64.1-92 provide::; that an authenticated copy of any will which has heen selfproved
under the laws of another state shall, when offered
with its authenticated certificate of probate, be admitted to probate as a will of personalty and real estate.
Thu::;, a self-proving will with an out-of-::;tate notarial
certificate, if probated el::;ewhere. can be probated in
Virginia with relative ease. The restrictions on out-ofstate notarial certificates found in §§ 64.1-H7.1 and
64.1-R7.2 are also inconsistent with the Virginia version of the Uniform Recognition of Acknowledgements Act, which, at ~ 5.5-11R.l provides: "Notarial
acts may be performed outside this state for use in
this state with the same effect as if performed by a
notary of this state."
Because of the remoteness of the possibility of fraud
and the ,- 'Jai lability Ii o}Jportunities under' Virginia
law to contest the validity of will::; by formal proceedings, the limiting of ~§ 64.1-87.1 and f:i4.1-H7.2 to only
wills that have been acknowledged before Virginia
officials is unwarranted and unduly restrictive.
Amendments are proposed to ~~ 64 .1-1-\7.1 and 64.1H7.2 and are set forth in the Appendix as Ipgislative
proposals 14 and 15.

Conclusion
The proposals discussed in this ariticle address perceived inadequacies in Virginia's wills statutes. They
are intended to facilitate the devolution of property in
a manner that more closely implements the intent of
testators, correct unintended conseq uences flowing
from recent amendments to the intestacy statutes,
remove unnecessary constraints on testation, eliminate ambiguities in existing Jaw and accommodate
more fully the testator who, having formulated and
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executed his estate plan in another state, acqUlres
property or becomes domiciled in Virginia.
APPENDIX
Note: Proposals 1, 2, 3, and 4 were presented in the
Spring, 19R:1 issue of the Virginia Bar Journal. They
involve amendments to § 64.1-64, § 64.1-65, S 64.1-58
and § 64.1-60.
Proposal 5. It is proposed that new § 64.1-69.1 be
enacted to read as follows :
§ 64.1-69.1 When omitted spouse to take intestate
portion.-If a testator fails to provide for a surviving
spouse who married the testator after the execution of
the will, the omitted spouse shall receive the same
share of the estate such spouse would have received if
the decedent left no will, unless it appears from the
will that the omission was intentional.
Proposal 6. It is proposed that § 64.1-59 be amended
and reenacted to read as follows:
§ 64.1-59. Revocation by divorce; no revocation by
other changes in circumstances.-If, after making a
will, the testator is divorced a vinculo matrimonii or
his marriage is annulled, the divorce or annulment
revokes any disposition or appointment of property
made by the will to the former spouse, any provision
conferring a general or special power of appointment
on the former spouse and any nomination of the
former spouse as executor, trustee, conservator or
guardian, unless the will expressly provides otherwise. Property pre\ ·,ted from passing to a former
spouse because of revocation by divorce or annulment
passes as if the former spouse fai· :I to survive the
testator, and other provisions conferring some power
or office on the former spouse are interpreted as if the
spouse failed to survive the testator. If provisions are
revoked solely by this section, they are revived by the
testator's remarriage to the former spouse. No change
of circumstances other than as described in this section revokes a will.
Proposal 7. It is proposed that new § 64.1-62.2 be
enacted to read as follows:
§ 64.1-62.2. Specific devise or bequest; burden of
secured dehts.-Unless a contrary intention shall
appear by the will, a devise or bequest of realty or of
tangible personalty shall pass to the devisee or legatee subject to any mortgage existing at the date of
death, without right of exoneration, and notwithstanding a general direction in the will to pay debts.
As used herein "mortgage" means deed of trust and
any conveyance, agreement or arrangement in which
property is used as security. Where any mortgaged
realty or tangible personalty passes to two or more
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persons, the interest of each such person shall, only
as between such persons, bear its proportionate share
of the debt secured. Where two or more such properties are mortgaged to secure a single indebtedness,
each such property shall, only as between the recipients thereof, bear its proportionate share of the
indebtedness by reference to values at date of death.
Proposal 8. It is proposed that § 64.1-67 be amended
and reenacted to read as follows:
§ 64.1-67. Exercise of power of appointment.Unless a contrary intention shall appear in the wiJI, a
residuary clause in a will or a will making general
disposition of all the testator's property does not exercise a power of appointment held by the testator.
Proposal 9. It is proposed that § 64.1-6:3 be amended
and reenacted to read as follows:
§ 64.1-63. When advancement deemed satisfaction
of devise or bequest.-Property which a testator gave
in his lifetime to a person is not treated as a satisfaction of a devise or bequest to that person, in whole or
in part, unless the will provides for deduction of the
lifetime gift, or the testator declares in a contemporaneous writing that the gift is to be deducted from
the devise or bequest or is in satisfaction thereof, or
the devisee or legatee acknowledges in writing that
the gift is in satisfaction.
Proposal 10. It is proposed that new S 64.1-62.1 be
enacted to read as follows:
§ 64.1·62.1. How certain legacies and devise to he
construed; nonademptiorr in certain cases.-Unless a
contrary intention shall appear in the will:
a) a bequest of specific securities whether or not
expressed in number of shares shall include as much
of the bequeathed securities as is part of the estate at
time of the testator's death , any additional or other
securities of the same entity owned by the testator by
reason of action initiated by the entity, (but excluding
any acquired by exercise of purchase options) and
any securities of another entity acquired with respect
to the specific securities mentioned in the bequest as a
result of a merger, consolidation, reorganization or
other similar action initiated by the entity;
b) a bequest or devise of specific property shall
include any amount of a condemnation award for the
taking of the property unpaid at death and any pro·
ceeds unpaid at death on fire and casualty insurance
on the property.
c) a devise or bequest of specific property shall, in
addition to such property as is part of the estate of the
testator, be deemed to be a legacy of a pecuniary
amount if such specific property shall, during the
life of the testator and while he is under a disability,
be sold by a conservator, guardian, or committee for

the testator, or by judicial sale, or if a condemnation
award or proceeds of fire or casualty insurance as to
such property are paid to such fiduciary . For this purpose, the pecuniary amount shall be the net sale price,
condemnation award or insurance proceeds, reduced
by such sums received under subsection (b). This subsection shall not apply if, after the sale, condemnation, or casualty, it is adjudicated that the disability
of the testator has ceased and the testator survives
the adjudication by one year.

Proposal 11. It is proposed that § 64.1-73 (Devise or
bequest to trustee of an established trust) be amended
and reenacted to delete subsection (a)(3) and (h),
which subsections pertain to non-resident trsutees.
Proposal 12. It is proposed to amend and reenact
§ 64.1-7:1 (Devise or bequest to trustee of an established
trust) by adding new subsection (d)(3) to read as
follows:
§ 64.1-7,3(d)(3). Any interest in remainder under
such trust as to property so devised or bequeathed
and not otherwise conditioned on survival of the testator shall not be defeated by reason of the death of
the remainderman prior to that of the testator. In such
event, the interest in remainder shall pass as if the
remainderman had survived the testator.
Proposal 13. It is proposed that § 64.1·49 be
amended and reenacted to read as follows:
S 64.1-49. Will must be in writing, etc; mode of execution ; witnesses, and proof of hand writ in g.-No will
shall be valid unless it be in writing and signed by the
testator, or by some other person in his presence and
by his direction, in such manner as to make it manifest that the name is intended as a signature; and
moreover, unless the material provisions thereof be in
the handwriting of the testator, such will must be
signed by at least two competent witnesses each of
whom witnessed either the signing or the testator's

acknowledgement of the signature or of the will. If the
material provisions of the will be in the handwriting
of the testator, that fact shall be proved by at least
two competent witnesses.

Proposal 14. It is proposed that § 64.1-R7.!. be
amended and reenacted by revising the first and last
paragraphs thereof to read as follows:
§ 64.1-87.1. How will may be made self-proved .-A
will, at the time of its execution or at any subsequent
date, may be made self-proved by the acknowledgement thereof by the testator and the affidavits of two
or more attesting witnesses, each made before an
officer authorized to administer oaths under the laws
of this Commonwealth, or of the state where the
acknowledgement occurred, and evidenced by the
officer's certificate, attached or annexed to the wiII in
form and content substantially as follows: ... (omitted portions of statute) ...
All certificates to wills made pursuant to this section and executed by the officer before June 1, 1977
shall be held, and the same are hereby declared valid
and effective in all respects if otherwise in accordance
with the provisions of this section, notwithstanding
that such officer did not attach or affix his official
seal thereto, and notwithstanding that the acknowledgement was before an officer authorized to administer oaths under the laws of another state. Any
codicil which is self-proved under the provisions of
this section which also, by its terms, expressly confirms, ratifies and republishes a will except as altered
by the codicil shall have the effect of self-proving the
will whether or not the will was so executed originally.
Proposal 15. It is proposed that S 64.1 -87.2 be
amended and reenacted by revising the first paragraph to read the same as the first paragraph III
§ 64.1-87.1, set forth in Proposal 14 above.
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